You scanned it, a payment page opened, you entered your card for $4. The parking was real. The QR code wasn't.
A sticker on a parking meter with a QR code. City branding. An ordinance number. "Pay for Parking Here." You scanned it, a payment page popped up, and it asked for your card number to pay $4.00.
The sticker was placed there by a scammer. The payment page wasn't the city's — it was built to capture your full card details. You paid $4 for parking and gave away your card number, expiration, CVV, and billing ZIP in the process.
Here's the thing about QR codes: you can't see where they go before you scan them. With a URL, you can at least glance at the domain. A QR code is a black box. It could point to the city's parking system or it could point to a server in Eastern Europe. You have no way to tell from looking at it.
And we've been trained to scan without thinking. Restaurants replaced menus with QR codes. Event check-ins use QR codes. Parking, bike shares, transit — everything has a QR code now. The action of "scan and go" is automatic for most people.
Scammers exploit this by placing stickers on top of or near legitimate QR codes in public spaces. Parking meters are the most common target because people expect to pay and the amounts are small enough to not trigger scrutiny.
Before scanning any QR code in a public place: is it a sticker? Does it look added after the fact? Is the URL it shows you one you recognize? Three seconds of looking before tapping could save you from a compromised card.